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Gilles Deleuze is rightly regarded as a vitalist thinker in the sense that a 
concept of impersonal life is central to his philosophy.1 The ontology of 
events in The Logic of Sense, the ontology of pure transcendental ideas 
in Difference and Repetition and the machinic ontology of Anti-Oedipus 
and A Thousand Plateaus each reproduces in its own terms the concept 
of an indeterminate, abstract, non-organic and intensive life that is prior 
to its incarnation in fi xed and organized forms. These forms may be 
biological, technological, cultural or intellectual, but in all cases they 
are secondary determinations of an ontologically primary fl ux of be-
coming: “If everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or 
organized but, on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of 
life. In short, the life in question is non-organic, germinal and intensive, 
a powerful life without organs . . .” (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand 
Plateaus 499).
Giorgio Agamben distinguishes Deleuze’s concept of life from 
Aristotle’s concept of the bare biological life common to all living 
things. For Aristotle, the condition or ground on which a thing is said 
to be living is what he calls the “nutritive faculty”: “the movement im-
plied in nutrition and decay or growth. This is why all plants seem to us 
to live. It is clear that they have in themselves a principle and a capac-
ity by means of which they grow and decay in opposite directions . . .” 
(Aristotle De anima qtd. in Agamben “Absolute Immanence” 231). This 
is not so much a defi nition of life as a characterization of its most basic, 
vegetative form that serves as the principle on the basis of which other 
things can be called living. By contrast, Deleuze’s concept of life func-
tions in precisely the opposite way. It is not the lowest common form 
of life shared by all living things but rather “a principle of virtual inde-
termination, in which the vegetative and the animal, the inside and the 
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outside and even the organic and the inorganic . . . cannot be told apart” 
(Agamben 233).
Deleuze and Guattari’s complex concept of absolute and relative de-
territorialization involves yet another expression of this concept of an ab-
stract and impersonal life that unfolds only in particular cases. Relative 
deterritorialization takes place on the actual plane of organizations of 
real people, things and historical processes. Absolute deterritorialization 
takes place on the virtual plane of abstract machines, pure events and 
various kinds of becoming. It is because this is not a transcendent plane 
of existence but a more profound dimension of the actual world that 
Deleuzian ontology is rightly regarded as a philosophy of immanence. 
Absolute deterritorialization is another name for the abstract life that is 
expressed in all things. For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari write: “The 
deeper movement for conjugating matter and function—absolute deter-
ritorialization, identical to the earth itself—appears only in the form of 
respective territorialities, negative or relative deterritorializations, and 
complementary reterritorializations” ( A Thousand Plateaus 143). 
Throughout his career, Deleuze engages with literary works in order 
to elaborate and exemplify his philosophical concept of life. In a chap-
ter of Dialogues, he justifi es his preference for the English and American 
literature of Thomas Hardy, D.H. Lawrence, Herman Melville, F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, Virginia Woolf, Henry Miller and others by reference to the 
manner in which it invents new possibilities for life. These writers por-
tray life as a process of self-transformation or escape from established 
identities in favour of fl ight towards another world. For them, writing is 
a matter of tracing lines of fl ight or processes of becoming which have 
the potential to lead to the creation of new forms of life. Such creation 
only occurs when existing forms of life break down and the individual in 
question gains access to the primary and transformative power of pure 
life: “writing does not have its end in itself precisely because life is not some-
thing personal. Or rather, the aim of writing is to carry life to the state of 
a non-personal power (Deleuze and Parnet 50).2 
Although he does not propose any systematic philosophy of litera-
ture, much of Deleuze’s writing from Proust and Signs to Essays Critical 
and Clinical is, as Ronald Bogue suggests, “a thinking alongside liter-
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ary works, an engagement of philosophical issues generated from and 
developed through encounters with literary texts” (2). It is in the spirit 
of these encounters that I propose to read J. M. Coetzee’s 1999 Booker 
Prize winning novel Disgrace through the lens of Deleuze’s vitalist phi-
losophy. My aim is not only to outline a Deleuzian reading of Disgrace 
but also to use the novel to explore the personal and political dimensions 
of this concept of life and related concepts such as becoming-minor and 
becoming-animal. I suggest that Coetzee deserves to be added to the 
Deleuzian literary canon for the way in which Disgrace presents a con-
ception of pure life as immanent in the everyday existence of humans 
and animals alike, for the manner in which the central protagonist em-
barks on a line of fl ight or deterritorialization which transforms his sense 
of who he is and his understanding of life, and fi nally for the process 
through which this transformation takes place by means of becoming-
animal.
Becoming-minor and Becoming-animal 
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari develop a version of the 
ontology of life as a process of becoming in the form of a theory of mul-
tiplicities or machinic assemblages. Ultimately, these assemblages or ab-
stract machines are a kind of open or evolving multiplicity which is itself 
a process of becoming other: “becoming and multiplicity are the same 
thing” (249). The ontological priority of becoming in this machinic 
metaphysics is refl ected in the fact that assemblages are defi ned not by 
their forms of conservation but by their forms of modifi cation or meta-
morphosis, by their “cutting edges of deterritorialization” (88). In these 
terms, Deleuze and Guattari argue that individuals no less than societies 
are defi ned by their lines of fl ight or deterritorialization, by which they 
mean that there is no person and no society that is not conserving or 
maintaining itself on one level, while simultaneously being transformed 
into something else on another level. In other words, fundamental shifts 
in personal and social identity happen all the time. Sometimes these 
happen by degrees, but sometimes, fundamental changes occur through 
the sudden eruption of events, which inaugurate a new fi eld of personal, 
social or affective possibilities. These are turning points in individual 
104
Pau l  Pa t t on
lives or in history after which some things will never be the same as 
before. They are examples, Deleuze suggests, of “a becoming breaking 
through into history” (Negotiations 153).
In general terms, Deleuze and Guattari understand by “becoming” 
more or less what Jacques Derrida understands by the process of itera-
tion, namely “the action by which something or someone continues to 
become other (while continuing to be what it is)” (What is Philosophy? 
177, translation modifi ed). However, whereas Derrida tends to confi ne 
himself to analyses of the structure of iterability in various fi elds, or to 
analyses of the “to-come” which remains an immanent condition of the 
possibility and impossibility of change, Deleuze and Guattari describe 
a series of more specifi c ways in which individuals and groups become 
other. A Thousand Plateaus is a work of political philosophy and, in this 
context, they are interested not simply in processes of becoming-other 
in general but in the social dynamic by means of which majoritarian 
social and political identities are transformed. They rely upon a concept 
of minority to defi ne a specifi c kind of becoming which is intimately 
connected to the processes of deterritorialization which defi ne a given 
assemblage or multiplicity. They distinguish between minorities, con-
ceived as subsystems or determinate elements within a given majority, 
and the process of becoming-minor, which refers to the potential of 
every element to deviate from the standard or norm, which defi nes that 
majority. In these terms, to become-minor is to embark upon a process 
of deterritorialization or divergence from the standard or norm in terms 
of which the majoritarian identity is defi ned. There is no such thing 
as becoming-majoritarian: “all becoming is minoritarian” (A Thousand 
Plateaus 106). 
In so far as the subject of modern European society and political com-
munity, the subject of rights, duties and moral obligations, is human, 
adult, male and overwhelmingly white, then animals, children, women 
and people of colour are minorities. Moreover, it follows that becoming-
animal, becoming-child, becoming-woman and becoming-coloured are 
potential paths of deterritorialization of the “majority” in this non-quan-
titative sense of the term. For this reason, A Thousand Plateaus devotes 
pages to the description of these distinct types of becoming and the dif-
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ferent cultural, social and political forms they assume. Taken together, 
becoming-woman, becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible and so 
on, amount to a series of possible paths which lead beyond existing 
forms of human sociality towards what they call in What is Philosophy? 
new earths and peoples “to come” (108–10). 
Consider the case of becoming-animal: Deleuze and Guattari point out 
that anthropology, myth and folk-tales provide evidence of a widespread 
human propensity for a variety of becomings-animal. From a historical 
point of view, these processes of becoming-animal are often related to 
marginal social groups or movements, so that there is “an entire politics 
of becomings-animal, as well as a politics of sorcery, which is elaborated 
in assemblages that are neither those of the family nor of religion nor of 
the State. Instead they express minoritarian groups, or groups that are 
oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognised 
institutions” (A Thousand Plateaus 247). In literature, too, we fi nd many 
different forms of becoming-animal. These typically involve the one un-
dergoing a becoming standing in a relation to a pack or multiplicity of 
some kind, but also to an anomalous fi gure located on the border of the 
multiplicity who represents a limit beyond which everything changes. 
The white whale in Melville’s Moby Dick provides an example of one of 
these fi gures with whom an individual enters into a pact in order to pass 
beyond a given state of life or being. He is anomalous in the sense that 
he represents “the unequal, the coarse, the rough, the cutting edge of 
deterritorialization” (A Thousand Plateaus 244). Deleuze and Guattari 
specify that becoming only occurs when there is a certain kind of rela-
tionship between two terms or when something passes between them 
such that both are transformed. Through his relentless pursuit of Moby 
Dick, Ahab enters into a becoming-whale while at the same time the 
object of his pursuit becomes the white wall of human weakness and 
fi nitude through which he desires to pass: “How can the prisoner reach 
outside except by thrusting through the wall? To me, the white whale is 
that wall, shoved near to me. Sometimes I think there’s naught beyond. 
But ‘tis enough’” (167). Ahab’s becoming is a line of fl ight or deterritori-
alization that both expresses the extraordinary singularity that he is and 
takes him beyond the limits of his own individual life.
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Becomings-animal are not a matter of imitating the animal, nor do 
they always imply actual transformation into the animal concerned. 
When they do, as in “The Transformation [Metamorphosis],” Kafka’s 
story of Gregor Samsa’s transformation into a gigantic insect, the result 
is a strange hybrid of human and animal capacities. Becoming-animal 
is always a matter of enhancing or decreasing the powers one has, or 
acquiring new powers by entering into a “zone of proximity” with the 
animal. Moreover, since it is always a human that is the subject of be-
coming-animal, the metamorphosis can take place on a variety of levels, 
including the physiological powers of the animal as in the case of Gregor, 
or the powers that the animal is merely believed to possess as in cases of 
witchcraft and sorcery. These combinations point to the key element of 
becoming-animal, namely that it is always a matter of forming an inter-
individual assemblage with the real or imagined powers of the animal 
in question. 
Deleuze and Guattari use Spinoza’s concept of affect to refer to the 
different kinds and degrees of power that defi ne an individual body. 
On this basis, they outline a Spinozist ethology that would defi ne ani-
mals not by their species or genus but by the active and passive affects 
of which they animal is capable: “We know nothing about a body until 
we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they 
can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects 
of another body. . .” (A Thousand Plateaus 257). The Deleuzian idea of 
an immanent, non-organic life underwrites this defi nition of individu-
als in terms of their affects. For Deleuze, all things exist on this imma-
nent plane of impersonal life before they are identifi ed as natural kinds 
or persons, which in turn allows for the possibility of “unnatural par-
ticipation” between assemblages as different as a man and a giant insect. 
Understood in this manner, individuals are assemblages defi ned by their 
capacities to affect and be affected and, in what amounts to the other 
side of the same coin, by the becomings of which they are capable.
South Africa, Becoming-animal and the People to Come
Coetzee’s Disgrace is set in post-Apartheid South Africa where the lives 
of the central characters are conditioned by the historical divide between 
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colonizing and colonized peoples. The diffi cult process of dismantling 
the colonial regime is directly implicated in many of the events that 
befall them. It is unquestionably a novel about the painful transition to a 
new South Africa, but not only that. The central character, David Lurie, 
is an aging male professor of English literature who is increasingly as out 
of touch with himself as he is with the requirements of life in the new 
university, let alone the new social relations emerging between men and 
women, Europeans and other Africans. While he is conscious of his age, 
his life is also a self-centred denial of his mortality and his dependence 
on others. Lurie remains an unredeemed and in many ways unredeem-
able character, but he also enters into a becoming-animal, which opens 
up the possibility of transformation in his way of being in the world. 
The intimations of change in his character suggest that this is a novel 
about relations between the sexes, human fi nitude and the natural life 
we share with animals as much as the ongoing effects of colonial social 
relations.
Lurie possesses an extraordinary capacity for self-serving interpreta-
tions of his own actions and those of others. The novel opens with an 
account of his weekly assignation with a prostitute, which ends after 
they accidentally meet in a public place: the look in her eyes is enough 
to shatter his illusions about their relationship. His efforts to maintain a 
Romantic idea of his virile self lead him into a predatory sexual relation-
ship with a female student, Melanie Isaacs, for which he is subsequently 
charged and found guilty of sexual harassment. He refuses any form of 
contrition or apology and is eventually forced to resign from his posi-
tion. This loss of position sets him off on a line of fl ight that eventually 
leads to the deterritorialization of his personal, social, professional and 
intellectual world. He goes to visit his daughter, Lucy, who lives on a 
small farm in the country where she makes a modest living growing pro-
duce and fl owers and operating a boarding kennel for dogs. The pres-
ence of these dogs does not prevent an attack on the farm by a gang of 
young African men in which Lucy is subjected to a brutal sexual assault 
and Lurie is beaten and set alight with methylated spirits. 
While at his daughter’s farm, Lurie helps out with the kennel and 
begins to care for the Dobermans, German Shepherds, Ridgebacks, Bull 
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Terriers and Rottweilers that Lucy describes at one point as “Watchdogs, 
all of them” (Coetzee 61). His sympathy for these abandoned former 
guard dogs is nourished by the sentiment that they, like him, are part 
of the debris of history: animals out of place in the new South Africa. 
He later works at an animal refuge where he helps another woman, Bev 
Shaw, to kill and dispose of unwanted strays. He has a brief and joyless 
but also victimless affair with Bev; it is the experience of putting down 
the dogs, however, which has a profound effect upon him:
He had thought he would get used to it. But that is not what 
happens. The more killings he assists in, the more jittery he 
gets. One Sunday evening, driving home in Lucy’s kombi, he 
actually has to stop at the roadside to recover himself. Tears 
fl ow down his face that he cannot stop; his hands shake.
He does not understand what is happening to him. Until 
now, he has been more or less indifferent to animals . . . 
His whole being is gripped by what happens in the theatre. 
He is convinced the dogs know their time has come . . . they 
fl atten their ears, they droop their tails, as if they too feel the 
disgrace of dying . . . (142–3).
When his daughter reveals that she is pregnant as a result of her rape, 
he decides to stay on and help where he can. At the refuge, he develops 
a particular fondness for one young partly crippled dog that befriends 
him during the brief period of grace before it must be put down. The 
novel ends with him “giving up” this animal to its inevitable end and 
disgrace.
It is easy to see Lurie as an allegorical fi gure representing, if not the 
habits and attitudes of the ruling class of the old colonial regime, then 
at least the Eurocentric and cultured cast of mind that sustained the pos-
sibility of colonial relations. He is initially disdainful of his daughter’s 
peasant life in the country. He aspires to a higher and more cultured 
plane of existence. Much of his time is spent preparing to write an opera 
based on the last days of the life of Byron. Like the rest of his profession-
al life, this project goes nowhere. On this level, his story is one of disem-
powerment and disgrace: fi rst at the university, then at the hands of the 
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gang who attack him and sexually assault his daughter, then once again, 
voluntarily this time, before the family of his young victim. Despite his 
apology to the student and her parents, he remains unwilling to change, 
unrepentant about his rape of the student and uncomprehending of the 
social changes taking place around him. He often fails to comprehend 
the motives of others, especially those of his student, his daughter and 
her African neighbor Petrus. At one point, he says to Lucy: “I am not 
prepared to be reformed. I want to go on being myself ” (77).3
Many commentators have been disturbed by “the bleak image of the 
‘new South Africa’” presented in Disgrace (Attridge “Age of Bronze” 99). 
There is much in the novel besides the character of David Lurie to sug-
gest a gloomy outlook on the possibility of transforming relations be-
tween the races. The always tense and sometimes violent interactions 
between white and black show how deeply the social, linguistic and 
psychic structures of the old colonial system are embedded in social life. 
Coetzee points to the enormous diffi culty of transforming the inherited 
structures of temperament and language. At one point, Lurie is repre-
sented as becoming more and more “convinced that English is an unfi t 
medium for the truth of South Africa” ( 117). The sexual violence in-
fl icted on Lucy during the attack on her farm, the apparent immunity 
of the perpetrators, along with the transformation of her African neigh-
bor Petrus from gardener and “dog-man” to farmer and landowner, 
suggest a post-Apartheid political process in which a rearrangement of 
positions rather than a genuine transformation of social relations takes 
place. In these terms, the roles of white and black, oppressor and op-
pressed, would be simply reversed. While some regard the novel as accu-
rate reportage of attitudes and social relations, others have criticized the 
novel for its apparent pessimism about the possibility of progress toward 
a non-racist and non-sexist society.4 For example, Salman Rushdie, in 
a widely circulated review, takes the mutual incomprehension of the 
characters in the novel to encapsulate its bleak vision of post-Apartheid 
politics: “The whites don’t understand the blacks and the blacks aren’t 
interested in understanding the whites . . . Petrus comes closest, but his 
motives remain enigmatic and his presence grows more menacing as the 
novel proceeds” (297–98). On this reading, there is no transformation 
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in either the individual characters or the social relations in which their 
lives unfold. 
By contrast, reading Disgrace in the light of the Deleuzean concepts 
of life, becoming-minor and becoming-animal enables us to appreciate 
a more affi rmative side to the novel. Even if it is only indirectly related 
to the diffi cult social and political transitions that provide its historical 
context, evidence of a capacity for change is portrayed in the lives of the 
central characters. In Deleuzian terms, there is evidence of minoritarian 
becoming, both at the level of the micro-politics of social relations and 
even in the apparently unredeemable character of Lurie. Minoritarian-
becoming in the Deleuzian sense occurs only if there is movement or 
transformation in the assemblage concerned. There must be some line 
of fl ight or deterritorialization along which this particular majoritar-
ian subject begins to change. In the case of Lurie and his daughter, this 
transformation takes place by means of a becoming-animal.
Their different responses to the attack upon them by the young 
African men are symptomatic of the diffi cult choices confronting 
Europeans in this formerly colonial society. Whereas Lurie he wants the 
perpetrators brought to account and his own and his daughter’s self-
 respect restored, Lucy is more concerned to be able to live alongside her 
African neighbors. She accepts the transformation in her relations to 
Petrus, her former helper and “dog man”, who now becomes her neigh-
bor and owner of what was formerly her land. In the end, her response 
is to accept that she will have to rely on Petrus rather than the police 
or the armed white neighbors for protection against other African men. 
She even accepts that one of the attackers is a relative of Petrus and as 
such entitled to the same protection. She agrees to surrender her land 
in exchange for a place within his extended family and accepts what her 
father can only perceive as humiliation: “Perhaps that is what I must 
learn to accept. To start at ground level. With nothing. Not with noth-
ing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, 
no dignity.” “Like a dog.” “Yes, like a dog.” (205).
Lucy’s becoming-dog must be understood in its specifi c context. It 
does not imply her acceptance of all that associated with dogs in the 
human imagination. It is explicitly contrasted with the behavior of her 
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attackers who have marked her out as part of their territory and who 
she compares to “dogs in a pack” (158–9). It does represent an affi lia-
tion with the lack of property, rights and dignity often associated with 
dogs. Because it implies abandonment of any claim to precedence over 
her neighbor, it also represents a point of departure for the transfor-
mation of psychic and social relations associated with the old regime. 
While her father cannot see past the injustice done to one of his own by 
one of Petrus’s people, she is personally engaged in bringing into being 
a new people or a “people to come.” Throughout the novel, she is far 
more conscious of the historical changes under way than her father, and 
far more deliberate in her responses to them. It is signifi cant that Petrus 
describes her as “forward looking” (136). Lucy’s willingness to embark 
upon a becoming-African by transferring her land to Petrus and accept-
ing his protection points toward the possibility of what Deleuze and 
Guattari would describe as “positive” rather than “negative” deterritori-
alization of the social and affective structures of the apartheid era.5 
What then are we to make of the fact that Coetzee chooses to rep-
resent the beginnings of the micropolitical dismantling of apartheid 
through Lucy’s story? As several critics have pointed out, the burden 
of white guilt in the novel is heavily inscribed upon the body of this 
white woman: “White dominance and the overcoming of white domi-
nance are both fi gured as involving the subjection of the female body, 
as part of a long history of female exploitation of which the narrative 
itself takes note” (Boehmer 344).6 If indeed the novel may be supposed 
to suggest that the acceptance of rape is an inescapable cost of transition 
towards an effectively post-colonial society, then it is as Elleke Boehmer 
suggests “a disappointing assessment” (349). However, within the con-
text of the narrative, it is also possible to read Lucy’s response to the ap-
palling events over which she has little or no control as evidence of the 
extraordinary strength of her commitment to a new social order and a 
people to come. It is her choice not to speak to the police about her rape. 
She agrees that, in another time and place this might be a public matter, 
but chooses to regard it as her own private business “in this place, at this 
time,” this place being South Africa (Coetzee 112). She chooses to stay 
rather than to take up her father’s offer to help her leave the country and 
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rejoin her mother in Holland. She even chooses to keep the child that 
she bears as a result of the attack.
As we saw in the example of Melville’s Ahab, becomings typically 
take place in relation to some particular qualitative multiplicity and are 
often mediated by an anomalous fi gure at the border of the multiplic-
ity who represents the threshold of absolute deterritorialization. In rela-
tion to Lucy’s becoming-African in Disgrace it is Petrus who plays this 
role. We are only given glimpses of Petrus’s own story and then large-
ly through the eyes of his white interlocutors. From their perspective, 
African people and social relations are mysterious, sometimes threat-
ening, but always other. It is in relation to Petrus’s story that Lurie ex-
presses his doubts about the capacity of English to convey the truth of 
South Africa: “He would not mind hearing Petrus’s story one day. But 
preferably not reduced to English” (117). At the same time, Petrus is the 
sole point of ethical contact between Lucy and her father and the largely 
undifferentiated indigenous African population. Apart from him, there 
is only the violence of the young men. It is through her relationship to 
Petrus and her refusal to dictate the terms of this relation or to give it up 
after the attack on her that Lucy’s becoming-dog is bound up with her 
becoming-African. Hers is a painful but also a positive micropolitical 
story of the deterritorialization of the social relations which were both 
products and supports of the colonial regime. The kind of becoming-
African portrayed here is not and cannot be the kind of new beginning 
that breaks suddenly and completely from the past, but is perhaps the 
only possible form of transition to a truly post-colonial society.
In Lurie’s case, too, the beginnings of a shift in his attitudes and sen-
sibility take place by way of a becoming-animal that is also a form of 
minoritarian-becoming in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the term. 
According to their account of the concept, minoritarian-becoming is 
always complex and tends to occur in combination with other processes, 
which form a “bloc” of becoming. In Lucy’s case, her becoming-dog is 
bound up with her becoming-peasant and becoming-African. In her fa-
ther’s case, his becoming-dog is bound up with a becoming-woman as he 
develops an increasingly critical awareness of his masculinity. His iden-
tifi cation with the unwanted dogs which are disposed of at the clinic is 
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expressed at one point in the thought that “we are too menny” (146). He 
later becomes aware of the connections between his own sexual behav-
iour and that of the rapists and male dogs. He can inhabit their world, 
but the question is, he or Coetzee asks, “does he have it in him to be the 
woman?” (160).
Lurie’s becoming-dog is of an altogether different kind to that of his 
daughter. In the course of the novel, he enters into a series of affective al-
liances with particular animals, including one of the dogs in his daugh-
ter’s kennel, two sheep destined for slaughter at the hands of Petrus, and 
the crippled dog at the shelter. Through these encounters and through 
the attack on himself and his daughter, he acquires new levels of sen-
sitivity toward the feelings of others.7 He rediscovers within himself a 
capacity to love and care for others, including the daughter he does not 
understand. His work with the dogs enables him to cry in a way that 
he has not been able to before. In the end, despite his repeated protes-
tations that he is too old to learn new tricks, Lurie does become a dif-
ferent person. He learns to accept his daughter’s independence and her 
right to make choices in relation to her own life in the new South Africa, 
choices of which he would be incapable. In some respects, it is true that 
he remains a fi gure of the old world, someone who has no place in the 
new society slowly and painfully emerging from the ruins of apartheid. 
Accordingly, at the end of the novel, he spends most of his time with 
the stray dogs while remaining a spectator to the changes in the lives of 
his daughter and others actively engaged in the coming to be of the new 
South Africa. In relation to the historical and political changes occur-
ring around him, his story remains one of negative rather than positive 
deterritorialization.
Impersonal Life: The Life We Share with Animals
We saw above how Deleuze’s preference for Anglo-American literature 
has to do with the manner in which it traces lines of fl ight or processes 
of becoming through which characters, peoples and worlds are trans-
formed. As Ronald Bogue reminds us, “The line of fl ight ultimately is 
the trajectory of a process of becoming-other, the course of a line that 
always “passes between” (6). The different kinds of becoming-dog in 
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Disgrace are lines of fl ight in this sense. They are all associated with a 
particular kind of disgrace. As well as Lucy’s disgrace at the hands of her 
African attackers and her becoming-dog in response to the danger of 
continuing to live alone in the country, there is her father’s social dis-
grace at the University and his subsequent apology, on his knees and 
touching his forehead to the fl oor, before the mother and sister of his 
former student (Coetzee 173). In normal usage, as Derek Attridge notes, 
disgrace is opposed to honour rather than grace (“Age of Bronze” 105). 
Lurie is disgraced in this sense of the word by his treatment of Melanie 
and his subsequent refusal to apologize. Finally, there is another kind of 
disgrace that is arguably more important for the central character in the 
novel: “the disgrace of dying” which Lurie is convinced is perceived by 
the dogs at the refuge and which causes them to “fl atten their ears” and 
“droop their tails” as they are dragged over the threshold (143). 
Lurie’s experience with the dying dogs transforms his attitude to life 
and death. It is the turning point in his own affective constitution and 
his relations to others. Through this experience, he comes to accept the 
mundane and transitory character of his own existence. When he fi rst 
arrives at the farm, Lucy fi nds him disapproving of her chosen life and 
still committed to an intellectualist belief in higher forms of life. She 
defends her choice of a simple rural life by affi rming that: “there is no 
higher life. This is the only life there is. Which we share with animals” 
(74). At the end of the novel, Lurie “gives up” his favoured dog to death, 
thereby signalling his own reconciliation to the absence of any higher 
life and to the fi nitude of the life that he shares with animals.
For Deleuze, the life that good literature affi rms is not the person-
al life of the individual character but the impersonal and abstract life 
which is expressed in but irreducible to its particular incarnations. In his 
last, extraordinarily condensed text entitled “Immanence: A Life . . .” 
he outlines the manner in which, as absolute or pure immanence, life 
is at once impersonal, indeterminate and singular (4–5). To illustrate 
this concept, he invokes a passage from Our Mutual Friend, in which 
Dickens describes a near drowning. The character, Riderhood, was a 
rogue disliked by all who knew him. Nevertheless, when confronted 
with the sight of him hovering between life and death, those around 
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him cannot help but show a kind of respect and affection for the slight-
est signs of life: “No one has the least regard for the man: with them 
all, he has been an object of avoidance, suspicion and aversion; but the 
spark of life within him is curiously separable from himself now, and 
they have a deep interest in it, probably because it is life, and they are 
living and must die. . . .” (443–5). 
Deleuze uses this passage from Dickens to illustrate his concept of an 
impersonal and indefi nite life that is expressed in the lives of empiri-
cal individuals, but not only in these, and that is abstract but singular. 
This is what he calls “a life . . .” and it is this life which excites the in-
terest of the onlookers: not the everyday life of the individual man but 
an impersonal and indefi nite life that is visible only because it is on the 
point of withdrawing. Although it only becomes visible in such excep-
tional moments, this life is present not only at the moment when the 
individual confronts death but rather persists throughout all the mo-
ments that make up his life. It follows that this abstract, impersonal life 
is, for Deleuze, an instance of the virtual or inner realm of being that 
is actualized in real events and states of affairs: “What we call virtual is 
not something that lacks reality, but something that enters in to a pro-
cess of actualization by following the plane that gives it its own reality. 
The immanent event actualizes itself in a state of things” (“Immanence: 
A Life . . .” 5).
The distinction between the actual and the virtual that governs this 
characterization of a life is one that Deleuze draws in other ways in con-
texts. For example, he distinguishes between machinic assemblages and 
the abstract machines, which govern their operation, or between actual 
everyday empirical or historical events and the virtual or pure event 
which is expressed or incarnated in them. At one point in “Immanence: 
A Life . . .”, Deleuze suggests that the concept of an indeterminate and 
impersonal but singular life which he fi nds in Dickens is a concept of 
life as a pure event. In this passage, he says, “The life of the individual 
has given way to a life that is impersonal but singular nevertheless, and 
which releases a pure event freed from the accidents of inner and outer 
life . . . The singularities or events constitutive of a life coexist with the 
accidents of the corresponding life, but neither come together nor divide 
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in the same way. They do not communicate with one another in the 
same way as do individuals” (5). 
Coetzee also offers us a conception of pure indeterminate life that 
is expressed in the everyday existence of humans and animals alike. 
Despite his reliance upon theological terminology, this is a resolutely 
secular conception of an immanent life individuated in the form of par-
ticular lives. Early in the novel, David Lurie admits to believing that 
people have souls, but it is also clear that he has never thought of ani-
mals in this way. When he fi rst arrives at his daughter’s farm, he is con-
vinced that humans are “a different order of creation from the animals” 
(74). He invokes approvingly the doctrine of the Church Fathers that 
we are all souls even before we are born, whereas animals do not have 
proper souls: “Their souls are tied to their bodies and die with them” 
(78). By the end of the novel he is convinced that the room in which he 
and Bev administer death to the stray dogs is a place where “the soul is 
yanked out of the body” before it is “sucked away” (219). It is apparent 
that he no longer draws the same sharp distinction between different 
orders of creation.
At one point, soon after he has begun assisting Bev to ease the moment 
of death for the dogs, she says to him: “I don’t think we are ready to die, 
any of us, not without being escorted” (84). His role in the refuge of 
last resort is precisely that of escort and what he shares with the dogs is 
“the disgrace of dying” (143). This phrase may be read as an ironic ex-
pression of a post-Christian and secular conception of life. For if dying 
is a disgrace, then life must be a state of grace, a gift or a blessing from 
God. If animals had souls, it would be from this state that the animals 
at Bev’s shelter are forcibly evicted, as indeed we all are eventually. In 
effect, it is the perception of a disgrace in dying which forms the zone 
of indiscernibility in which he becomes-dog. At fi rst encounter this is 
a disgrace more threatening than the one associated with his dismissal 
from the university and the social death associated with that event. It 
threatens his sense of himself as a person whose life and whose projects 
have meaning over and above the life he shares with the animals. 
By the end of the novel, Lurie has learned to accept the inevitability 
of death and the fi nitude of the life he shares with animals. In his be-
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coming-dog, something passes between the two terms such that both 
are transformed. He becomes-dog but the favoured dog becomes ev-
erything that he is now able to give up, including his honour, his intel-
lectual pride and his attachment to life itself. He becomes capable of 
letting go of his social and personal identity. He gives up the state of 
grace for the disgrace of dying, but only once dying has been revalued 
to incorporate identifi cation with an impersonal and indeterminate life, 
the cosmic life that he now sees as passes through himself, his daughter 
and her child: “a line of existences in which his share, his gift, will grow 
inexorably less and less, till it may as well be forgotten” (217). In the act 
of giving up his favoured dog, Lurie becomes reconciled with his own 
mortality. He affi rms the impersonal life that is expressed in all fi nite 
lives, including his own. He is thereby redeemed from the ironically 
named “disgrace” of dying.
Notes
 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1st International Literature 
and Science Conference on The Future of Cyber, Virtual and Bio Literature, The 
New Korean Association of English Language and Literature, Pusan National 
University, 29 May 2003, and at the Annual Conference of the Australasian 
Association for Continental Philosophy, The University of Queensland, 22 
2003. I am grateful to participants on both occasions for their questions and 
comments, to Moira Gatens, Linnel Secomb, and to the anonymous readers for 
ARIEL for their generous and helpful comments on earlier drafts.
 2 Deleuze wrote very little about the law. However, in the Abécédaire interviews 
recorded with Parnet during the late 1980s he describes the creativity of legal 
jurisprudence in similar terms, pointing to the way the law evolves through deci-
sions in particular cases and to the role of jurisprudence in the invention of new 
rights. He argues against the rote application of an a-historical concept of hu-
man rights and in favour of the elaboration of new rights on a case-by-case basis. 
He defends a conception of the law analogous to his conception of philosophy 
as essentially open-ended and mobile, and argues that:
  To act for freedom, becoming revolutionary, when one turns to the jus-
tice system, is to operate in jurisprudence . . . that’s what the invention of 
law is . . . its not a question of applying “the rights of man” but rather of 
inventing new forms of jurisprudence . . . I have always been fascinated 
by jurisprudence, by law . . . If I hadn’t studied philosophy, I would have 
studied law, but precisely not “the rights of man,” rather I’d have stud-
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ied jurisprudence. That’s what life is. There are no “rights of man,” only 
rights of life, and so, life unfolds case by case. (“G as in Gauche”)
 3 Grant Farred comments that, through Lurie’s intransigence, “Coetzee takes us 
away from the heart of the country to the hard core of the dilemmas. How does 
one reform the recalcitrant?” (17).
 4 In April 2000, the ANC used Disgrace as evidence of persistent racism among 
white South Africans in a submission to a Human Rights Commission inquiry 
into racism in the media. For a discussion of this episode and its implied reading 
of the novel, see McDonald’s “Disgrace Effects” and Attwell “Race in Disgrace.”
 5 Relative (as opposed to absolute) deterritorialization is negative when the de-
territorialized element is immediately subjected to forms of reterritorialization, 
which enclose or obstruct its line of fl ight. It is positive when the line of fl ight 
prevails over secondary reterritorializations, even though it may still fail to 
connect with other deterritorialized elements or enter into a new assemblage 
(Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus 508–510). See also Patton Deleuze 
and the Political 106–107. 
 6 Georgina Horrell argues that the conditions of white people remaining in the 
new South Africa are “negotiated through the body of the (white) woman in 
the text . . . an inscription of guilt is performed upon the gendered fl esh. The 
implications of this observation demand interrogation” (31, 32). See also Louise 
Bethlehem “Pliant/compliant.”
 7 Elleke Boehmer comments on the role of animals in Disgrace as “the essential 
third term in the reconciliation of the human self and the human other” (346). 
She also points to Lurie’s abjection in the course of the attack and suggests that 
it is “from this point on that Lurie begins to work out that breakthrough into 
feeling the self of another, rather than rationalizing its experiences in terms of his 
own needs” (348). She goes on to point out problematic aspects of this apparent 
“atonement” on Lurie’s part.
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